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Rate limit 2FA code attempts and narrow the TOTP acceptance window

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This commit is contained in:
johnnyq
2026-07-27 18:36:43 -04:00
parent 97490bef3b
commit a4fdced10f
3 changed files with 60 additions and 5 deletions
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47
login.php
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@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ $row = mysqli_fetch_assoc(mysqli_query(
FROM logs
WHERE log_ip = '$session_ip'
AND log_type = 'Login'
AND log_action = 'Failed'
AND log_action IN ('Failed', 'MFA Failed')
AND log_created_at > (NOW() - INTERVAL 10 MINUTE)"
));
$failed_login_count = intval($row['failed_login_count']);
@@ -337,6 +337,26 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && (isset($_POST['login']) || isset($_
$current_code = intval($_POST['current_code']);
}
// Per-account limit on second factor attempts. The IP lockout at the
// top of this file can be spread across hosts, and anything reaching
// this point has already cleared the password, so the second factor
// needs a limit tied to the account rather than the source address.
// Only a request that passed the password check can add to this
// counter, so it cannot be used to lock another user out.
$mfa_locked = false;
if (!empty($current_code)) {
$row_mfa = mysqli_fetch_assoc(mysqli_query(
$mysqli,
"SELECT COUNT(log_id) AS failed_mfa_count
FROM logs
WHERE log_user_id = $user_id
AND log_type = 'Login'
AND log_action = 'MFA Failed'
AND log_created_at > (NOW() - INTERVAL 10 MINUTE)"
));
$mfa_locked = intval($row_mfa['failed_mfa_count']) >= 5;
}
$mfa_is_complete = false;
$extended_log = '';
@@ -362,7 +382,7 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && (isset($_POST['login']) || isset($_
}
// Validate MFA code
if (!empty($current_code) && TokenAuth6238::verify($token, $current_code)) {
if (!$mfa_locked && !empty($current_code) && TokenAuth6238::verify($token, $current_code, 1)) {
$mfa_is_complete = true;
$extended_log = 'with MFA';
}
@@ -494,7 +514,12 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && (isset($_POST['login']) || isset($_
'agent_user_id' => $user_id,
'agent_master_key' => $agent_master_key, // may be null
'token' => $pending_mfa_token,
'created' => time()
// Keep the original issue time on a retry so the pending
// window actually expires, instead of being pushed forward
// by every wrong code.
'created' => ($is_mfa_step && !empty($pending_mfa['created']))
? intval($pending_mfa['created'])
: time()
];
// Now that we've transferred what we need, it's safe to clear the dual-role pending session.
@@ -512,7 +537,21 @@ if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && (isset($_POST['login']) || isset($_
</div>
</div>";
if ($current_code !== 0) {
if ($mfa_locked) {
// No log row and no email while locked out. Both are
// per-request writes the attacker controls, and logging here
// would keep pushing the 10 minute window forward so the
// lockout could never clear. The MFA Failed rows that
// triggered it are already the audit trail.
header("HTTP/1.1 429 Too Many Requests");
$response = "
<div class='alert alert-danger'>
Too many incorrect 2FA codes. Please wait 10 minutes and sign in again.
</div>";
} elseif ($current_code !== 0) {
// Option B: set session_user_id BEFORE logAudit()
$session_user_id = $user_id;