diff --git a/agent/post/asset.php b/agent/post/asset.php
index e5db2ec0..b82a07f4 100644
--- a/agent/post/asset.php
+++ b/agent/post/asset.php
@@ -18,6 +18,19 @@ if (isset($_POST['add_asset'])) {
enforceClientAccess();
+ // Only the two credential fields this handler writes - name/description/uri here
+ // belong to the asset, not the credential, and have their own column widths.
+ // Checked before the asset is created, so an overlong credential can't leave a
+ // half-built asset behind. Form maxlength doesn't reach a hand-rolled POST.
+ if ($credential_field_too_long = checkCredentialLengths([
+ 'username' => $_POST['username'] ?? null,
+ 'password' => $_POST['password'] ?? null,
+ ])) {
+ flashAlert("Credential $credential_field_too_long is too long to store", 'error');
+ redirect();
+ exit;
+ }
+
$alert_extended = "";
mysqli_query($mysqli,"INSERT INTO assets SET asset_name = '$name', asset_description = '$description', asset_type = '$type', asset_make = '$make', asset_model = '$model', asset_serial = '$serial', asset_os = '$os', asset_uri = '$uri', asset_uri_2 = '$uri_2', asset_uri_client = '$uri_client', asset_location_id = $location, asset_vendor_id = $vendor, asset_contact_id = $contact, asset_status = '$status', asset_purchase_reference = '$purchase_reference', asset_purchase_date = $purchase_date, asset_warranty_expire = $warranty_expire, asset_install_date = $install_date, asset_physical_location = '$physical_location', asset_notes = '$notes', asset_favorite = $favorite, asset_client_id = $client_id");
diff --git a/agent/post/credential.php b/agent/post/credential.php
index 355a1b0c..23d3a9c6 100644
--- a/agent/post/credential.php
+++ b/agent/post/credential.php
@@ -563,8 +563,24 @@ if (isset($_POST["import_credentials_csv"])) {
fgetcsv($file, 1000, ","); // Skip first line
$row_count = 0;
$duplicate_count = 0;
+ $too_long_count = 0;
while(($column = fgetcsv($file, 1000, ",")) !== false){
$duplicate_detect = 0;
+
+ // Nothing client-side guards an uploaded file, and an overlong value is a hard
+ // MySQL error - skip the row and report it rather than losing the whole import
+ if (checkCredentialLengths([
+ 'name' => $column[0] ?? null,
+ 'description' => $column[1] ?? null,
+ 'username' => $column[2] ?? null,
+ 'password' => $column[3] ?? null,
+ 'otp_secret' => $column[4] ?? null,
+ 'uri' => $column[5] ?? null,
+ ])) {
+ $too_long_count = $too_long_count + 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
// Name
if (isset($column[0])) {
$name = escapeSql($column[0]);
@@ -589,7 +605,7 @@ if (isset($_POST["import_credentials_csv"])) {
$totp = escapeSql($column[4]);
}
// URL
- if (isset($column[4])) {
+ if (isset($column[5])) {
$uri = escapeSql($column[5]);
}
@@ -604,9 +620,9 @@ if (isset($_POST["import_credentials_csv"])) {
}
fclose($file);
- logAudit("Credential", "Import", "$session_name imported $row_count credential(s) via CSV file. $duplicate_count duplicate(s) found and not imported", $client_id);
+ logAudit("Credential", "Import", "$session_name imported $row_count credential(s) via CSV file. $duplicate_count duplicate(s) found and not imported, $too_long_count row(s) skipped for over-length fields", $client_id);
- flashAlert("$row_count credential(s) imported, $duplicate_count duplicate(s) detected and not imported", 'warning');
+ flashAlert("$row_count credential(s) imported, $duplicate_count duplicate(s) detected and not imported, $too_long_count row(s) skipped for over-length fields", 'warning');
redirect();
}
diff --git a/agent/post/credential_model.php b/agent/post/credential_model.php
index 4d839ac2..806814a4 100644
--- a/agent/post/credential_model.php
+++ b/agent/post/credential_model.php
@@ -2,6 +2,13 @@
// Model of reusable variables for client credentials - not to be confused with the ITFLow login process
defined('FROM_POST_HANDLER') || die("Direct file access is not allowed");
+// The form maxlength is client-side only - a hand-rolled POST gets here without it
+if ($credential_field_too_long = checkCredentialLengths($_POST)) {
+ flashAlert("Credential $credential_field_too_long is too long to store", 'error');
+ redirect();
+ exit;
+}
+
$name = escapeSql($_POST['name']);
$description = escapeSql($_POST['description']);
$uri = escapeSql($_POST['uri']);
diff --git a/api/v1/credentials/credential_model.php b/api/v1/credentials/credential_model.php
index 8d37b09b..24562f63 100644
--- a/api/v1/credentials/credential_model.php
+++ b/api/v1/credentials/credential_model.php
@@ -3,6 +3,29 @@
// Variable assignment from POST (or: blank/from DB is updating)
+/*
+ * There is no form behind the API, so nothing has capped these before they arrive.
+ * An overlong value is a hard MySQL error, not a truncation, so it would surface as a
+ * generic "insert query failed" - say what actually went wrong instead.
+ * Only the fields present are checked, which keeps partial updates working.
+ */
+$credential_field_too_long = checkCredentialLengths([
+ 'name' => $_POST['credential_name'] ?? null,
+ 'description' => $_POST['credential_description'] ?? null,
+ 'uri' => $_POST['credential_uri'] ?? null,
+ 'uri_2' => $_POST['credential_uri_2'] ?? null,
+ 'username' => $_POST['credential_username'] ?? null,
+ 'password' => $_POST['credential_password'] ?? null,
+ 'otp_secret' => $_POST['credential_otp_secret'] ?? null,
+]);
+
+if ($credential_field_too_long) {
+ $return_arr['success'] = "False";
+ $return_arr['message'] = "credential_$credential_field_too_long is too long to store.";
+ echo json_encode($return_arr);
+ exit();
+}
+
$api_key_decrypt_password = '';
if (isset($_POST['api_key_decrypt_password'])) {
$api_key_decrypt_password = $_POST['api_key_decrypt_password']; // No sanitization
diff --git a/functions/security.php b/functions/security.php
index 24c9632f..ef59dd50 100644
--- a/functions/security.php
+++ b/functions/security.php
@@ -175,6 +175,60 @@ function apiEncryptCredentialEntry(#[\SensitiveParameter]$credential_cleartext,
return $iv . $ciphertext;
}
+/*
+ * Longest cleartext a credential username or password may be.
+ * Both encrypt functions above return a 16-char IV followed by base64 AES-128-CBC
+ * ciphertext, which expands about 1.37x, so 350 is the most that still fits the
+ * varchar(500) columns. Keep in step with the maxlength on the credential/asset forms.
+ */
+define('CREDENTIAL_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH', 350);
+
+/*
+ * Checks a credential's cleartext fields against what the columns can actually store.
+ * Form maxlength is client-side only, so the CSV import, the API and any hand-rolled POST
+ * reach the INSERT with nothing stopping an overlong value - and MySQL rejects it outright
+ * rather than truncating, taking the request down with it.
+ *
+ * Returns the name of the first field that is too long, or an empty string when they all
+ * fit. Only keys actually present are checked, so partial updates are fine.
+ */
+function checkCredentialLengths(array $fields) {
+
+ // Encrypted before storage - ciphertext size follows the BYTE length of the cleartext.
+ $byte_limits = [
+ 'username' => CREDENTIAL_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH,
+ 'password' => CREDENTIAL_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH,
+ ];
+
+ // Stored as given - MySQL measures varchar in CHARACTERS, not bytes.
+ $char_limits = [
+ 'name' => 200,
+ 'description' => 500,
+ 'uri' => 500,
+ 'uri_2' => 500,
+ 'otp_secret' => 200,
+ ];
+
+ foreach ($byte_limits as $field => $limit) {
+ if (isset($fields[$field]) && strlen($fields[$field]) > $limit) {
+ return $field;
+ }
+ }
+
+ foreach ($char_limits as $field => $limit) {
+ if (!isset($fields[$field]) || strlen($fields[$field]) <= $limit) {
+ continue; // byte length caps character count, so this already fits
+ }
+ // Only worth counting characters once the cheap check fails. preg keeps this
+ // free of an mbstring dependency, which nothing else in the tree relies on.
+ if (preg_match_all('/./us', $fields[$field]) > $limit) {
+ return $field;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return '';
+}
+
// Cross-Site Request Forgery check for sensitive functions
// Validates the CSRF token provided matches the one in the users session
function validateCSRFToken(?string $token = null) {