generateUserSessionKey() built its AES-128 key with randomString(16), which
draws 12 random bytes and base64url-encodes them into 16 printable characters.
Those 16 characters were handed to openssl_encrypt as the 16-byte key, so the
key that wraps the site master key in the user's session carried 96 bits of
entropy instead of 128. Same for the IV.
The key and IV are now random_bytes(16) and stay raw for the cipher. Base64 is
applied only for transport - the cookie and the session copy of the IV - and
decoded again at the three read sites.
Sessions issued before this change will not decode and are not supported;
anyone logged in at deploy time is prompted to log in again. Nothing is stored
long term in this path, so there is nothing to migrate.
Also guards encryptCredentialEntry against a master key that failed to decrypt.
openssl_encrypt accepts false as a key and silently encrypts under an empty
key, so a session whose cookie had expired could write a credential that no
key would ever recover. It now returns false instead. This was reachable
before this change too, whenever a cookie expired mid-session.
generateUserSessionKey() built its AES-128 key with randomString(16), which
draws 12 random bytes and base64url-encodes them into 16 printable characters.
Those 16 characters were handed to openssl_encrypt as the 16-byte key, so the
key that wraps the site master key in the user's session carried 96 bits of
entropy instead of 128. Same for the IV.
The key and IV are now random_bytes(16) and stay raw for the cipher. Base64 is
applied only for transport - the cookie and the session copy of the IV - and
decoded again at the three read sites.
Sessions issued before this change will not decode and are not supported;
anyone logged in at deploy time is prompted to log in again. Nothing is stored
long term in this path, so there is nothing to migrate.
Also guards encryptCredentialEntry against a master key that failed to decrypt.
openssl_encrypt accepts false as a key and silently encrypts under an empty
key, so a session whose cookie had expired could write a credential that no
key would ever recover. It now returns false instead. This was reachable
before this change too, whenever a cookie expired mid-session.
script and per install. Replaces the mail queue's own lock file, which
was not atomic and could be deleted out from under a long run. Bounds
the SMTP conversation so an unresponsive server cannot hold the lock.
Recovers rows left at Sending by a run that died, which nothing
previously picked up.
Replaces the duplicated primary/billing/technical checks across portal pages, post.php handlers, nav, and dashboard with contactCan()/enforceContactCan(). Same behavior, but the rules now live in one place instead of being copy-pasted, which is what let them drift before. file.php keeps its 404 response; ticket-visibility and approval-routing checks are intentionally left as-is.
Keeps the credential decryption secret out of the URL, so it no longer lands in web-server access logs, proxy logs, or browser history. credentials/read.php now reads api_key_decrypt_password from the request body, matching create/update. Consumers reading decrypted credentials must send it in the body, not the query string.
API keys now run as a user and inherit that user's module, operation, and client permissions. Drops per-key client scoping and removes existing keys (must be recreated). Adds an edit modal to change a key's user.
